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WHEN SILENCE SCREAMS
Reed Elizabeth Loder*
Loneliness may curse the professional of today. Occasionally a
situation reveals a gaping fault-line between a professional's special-
ized thinking and the more holistic and intuitive responses of other
people, even other professionals. At these moments it becomes
especially evident why people feel estranged from those who serve
them.
The hypothetical situation that is the subject of this Symposium
arouses horror in most people in part just because the professionals
have to pause to contemplate a best course of action. The client has
confessed to committing a murder for which another man is soon to
be executed. The resolution seems self-evident even to people
accustomed to seeing fuzzy edges around their moral standards. Not
many harms, after all, are worse than death, and the imminent victim
is innocent of the crime even if he is not a generally appealing person.
How could professional silence ever be justified in such circumstanc-
es?
Although I am an attorney who teaches in a law school, I have
been asked to consider the hypothetical in my dual capacity as lawyer
and moral philosopher. Given that my work is steeped in legal ethics,
my remarks will focus on the lawyer's deliberations. Yet I hope that
much of what I have to say will also ring somewhat true for each of
the other professionals placed in this most unenviable of quandaries.
Not to skirt the point, I conclude that the layperson's instincts are
right. No moral argument does justify professional silence, although
the reasoning that leads me to this secure conclusion undoubtedly is
more complicated than a nonprofessional would think necessary or
palatable. In my view no general type of moral reasoning, or
particular array of professional arguments, overrides the obligation to
prevent severe and imminent harm to an innocent person. Assuming
the lawyer is quite convinced that the client is confessing truthfully,
as the hypothetical suggests, that knowledge gives the lawyer almost
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; University of Connecticut, J.D. (1983);
Boston University, Ph.D. (1979).
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exclusive power to prevent the impending harm and creates a strong
moral obligation to prevent it.
One philosophical approach to analyzing this case is to separate
moral reasoning about the problem into two broad categories. Under
that dichotomy, consequentialist reasoning evaluates the morality of
possible options from the point of view of the predicted results of
alternative courses of action. In contrast, deontological, or duty-
based, reasoning assesses the inherent morality of options and the
moral rights of the individuals involved. I shall maintain first that
silence cannot be justified within either a consequentialist or deonto-
logical framework. Second, I shall argue that these categories are
somewhat impoverished in that they do not explain all of what is
wrong with invoking professional confidentiality in this situation.
The quick-take of a consequentialist analysis might vindicate the
professional who leaves the decision ultimately to the client and
honors silence if that is the client's final choice. Most who would
accept this resolution probably would agree that the public defender
may converse with the client and facilitate his deliberations, although
some would say that moral discussions, and certainly moral advice, are
outside the scope of the professional relationship.' The overall
consequentialist reasoning for this position is that a lawyer plays an
essential role within our established system of justice, and confidenti-
ality is a centerpiece of that justifiable systemic role. Consequen-
tialists generally measure the morality of an act according to whether
the act promotes certain goods defined as desirable. The overarching
good governing this particular consequentialist judgment is justice. A
system that binds a lawyer to strong confidentiality best serves justice
overall, so the reluctant argument goes, even if this wrongfully
convicted person concededly suffers a particular injustice.
Ethical justifications for professional guidelines are most typically
consequentialist in their focus on institutions and systemic effects.
This is certainly true in the area of confidentiality. The most common
rationales for strong protection hinge on the overall effectiveness of
professional service.2 First, a client will tend to trust a lawyer who
1. Both of the primary ethical codes governing lawyers' conduct allow the lawyer to
raise moral considerations, although the codes do not require this. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983) (amended 1994) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
2. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 4-1; MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6
cmt., paras. 1-5.
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must keep information secret, and thus will disclose the kind of
detailed and nuanced information that permits the lawyer to craft a
solid case using professional expertise. Second, the client who does
not fear that the lawyer will broadcast information will seek timely
legal advice more readily. Third, the professional sworn to silence is
more likely to receive a client's confessions and has more opportuni-
ties to convince a client not to carry out intended harmful acts. Thus,
confidentiality serves social interests besides effective representation.
Nonetheless, others within the legal system, such as prosecutors and
police, are charged directly with protecting the larger society's
interests, and the lawyer's unique role as advocate best remains
distinct. The advocate's mission is especially clear within the criminal
justice system, where defense lawyers protect the liberty interests of
those accused against abuses of authority by the state. Indirectly, this
tempers government power for all members of society.
The first three consequentialist arguments have a common form:
X (confidentiality) is good because it leads to P (full disclosure), Q
(early advice), and R (opportunities for the lawyer to dissuade
misconduct). These are causal assertions (X causes P, Q, and R),
subject at least in principle to empirical verification. Someone could
study the legal system and attempt to gather data to answer empirical
questions like the following: Does confidentiality cause clients to
disclose factual information more fully than they otherwise would?
Does it cause them to seek more timely legal advice? If confidentiali-
ty does increase willingness to disclose or seek early advice, how
much of a role does it play? Are other factors more, equally, or less
important, such as apprehension about the future, awareness of the
need for technical expertise, a desire to vent emotions, or even a need
to confess? How much do clients even know about confidentiality?
Do lawyers volunteer information to clients? Is information that
lawyers do provide complete and accurate? Do clients ask about
confidentiality if their lawyers do not offer this information? What
other sources of information-for example, television, movies, or
popular novels-might supplant information from a professional?
No doubt, such data are difficult to gather. Perhaps that is why
we have very little empirical information available about the causal
assumptions made about confidentiality. Or, perhaps professionals
have been so accustomed to accepting facile assumptions that they fail
even to notice how fragile these assumptions may be and how much
they accept on faith. The sparse empirical work that adventuresome
scholars have done is too preliminary to wrench lawyers away from
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their comfortable attitudes Nonetheless, the early and rough results
of such research suggest at least that the link between stringent
confidentiality protection and the desired goods may be more tenuous
than the consequentialist arguments suggest.4
Surely, a problem like the one this hypothetical presents shows
that further research is needed. Even the barest hint of a weak
relationship between confidentiality and systemic goods is enough to
upset a lawyer's reliance on standard consequentialist arguments in
this case, where the consequences to the imminent victim of wrongful
execution are grave. One need not know the empirical subtleties of
precisely how strong confidentiality must be to achieve desirable
social ends to conclude that this case is a candidate for relaxation of
the protection.' If impending death is not enough of a consideration
to counterbalance absolute confidentiality, other negative consequenc-
es loom in terms of gross public disrespect for both lawyers and the
legal system that could countenance such an outcome.
"Wait one moment!" someone might interject. Our lawyer would
not even have received this deadly information had the client felt
inhibited in his disclosure. Now the lawyer has a fighting chance to
work something out with the client that will save the person wrongful-
ly accused. This chance for professional influence is one of the
strongest arguments for confidentiality in this case, the objector might
conclude.
The problem with this rejoinder is that it begs the crucial
empirical questions posed here about the client's reasons for
confessing to the public defender. Even if confidentiality did
encourage his disclosure, other influences also may be operating, such
as a psychological need to "unload" or a moral and religious need to
confess. The facts actually suggest the strong possibility that the
3. Law Professor Fred Zacharias has undertaken such a preliminary study of lawyers
and clients in Tompkins County, New York. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality,
74 IOWA L. REv. 351 (1989).
4. Id. at 394-96 (discussing clients' misunderstandings of confidentiality and clients'
possible independent reasons for seeking legal advice and disclosing).
5. Codes governing lawyers' conduct already do create exceptions to confidentiality.
For example, they allow lawyers to reveal future criminal acts. MODEL CODE, supra note
1, DR 4-101(C)(3) (permitting revelation of intended crimes to crimes involving bodily
harm); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (limiting revelation to criminal acts
"likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm"). The codes also permit
lawyers to reveal information as necessary to collect their fees or defend against charges
of misconduct. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 4-101(C)(4); MODEL RULES, supra note
1, Rule 1.6(b)(2).
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client is having last minute pangs when he blurts out this information
to the lawyer and then visits his religious adviser and therapist,
depositing the same information with them. If some sense of moral
urgency and guilt were not motivating this client, it is hard to fathom
why he would release this particular information since this is not a
situation where the information in question would help the lawyer to
defend him in the central matter of the representation.
"Wait!" the objector says again. Now you are making empirical
assumptions about other factors that encourage full revelation. You
are begging the question! The objector has rightly noticed the
uncertainty surrounding causal assumptions, reinforcing the need for
more research. Given an empirical standoff, however, is it better to
defer in this case to preventing imminent death or to the systemic
value of confidentiality? I think the answer is clear in this extreme
context, even if deference to confidentiality seems sound overall. The
stakes mean that the lawyer cannot afford to rely glibly on unexam-
ined assumptions or facile appeals to social poliy concerns. The
goods from disclosure that the consequentialist argument poses may
not be sufficient values in this situation.
None of this discussion suggests that either the causal or value
arguments for confidentiality are baseless. Intuitively, at least, it
seems pretty likely that a belief in confidentiality does lead some
clients to disclose some things they otherwise would not. It is
probably even a safer assumption that fuller factual disclosure
enhances a professional's ability to analyze a situation demanding
technical expertise. Surely confidentiality protects clients from
unscrupulous professionals who would use sensitive information for
their own advantage or that of other clients.6 These seem to be
acceptable, even good, arguments for professional secrecy in general.
The corrosive effects on client trust and willingness to disclose even
may justify deferring to confidentiality in more marginal cases where
some harm may result. Nonetheless, the standard value and causal
arguments pale in the stark situation here.
Confidentiality arguments may even break down in consequent-
ialist terms when lawyers accept the effectiveness of representation as
the strongest value. Expert effectiveness cannot be measured in full
factual knowledge alone, and the instrumental client trust that
6. Existing ethical codes forbid this. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.9; see
MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 4-101(B)(2).
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confidentiality potentially promotes may not result in the kind of
professional relationship that facilitates the highest quality service. It
strikes me that this client is imploring his lawyer for more. Minimally,
he has opened the door to thoughtful moral dialogue about what to
do. For the lawyer to overlook this is to make an unspeakably
insulting judgment about this client's character-that he wants his
freedom at the ultimate price of another's death. It is to stereotype
the client as an unfeeling criminal. It is to disregard the client's
probable moral anguish and to assume that he cares little about
himself as a moral being. Surely, the client perceives this level of
disrespect.
Instrumentally, the lawyer's narrow appraisal of the client is not
likely to foster better representation, if "better" means more
respectful and sensitive to the client's overall situation. If the state
carries out the execution, the client may face a "free" future of
tortured guilt. His desperate, albeit belated, efforts to "deal" may
suggest that he rejects this future on some level. By ignoring the
client's cues, the public defender will facilitate the client's deepest
moral deformation.
At the same time, it is a stretch to see how the client could
respect a professional who could turn a blind eye. Surely, the public
defender would not seem to be a person who cared about others if
she could be a silent conspirator in death. The client may wonder
how genuine, after all, is her concern or compassion for him. This is
not a person with a moral center, the client may conclude.
This reciprocal disrespect could stunt a full and productive
professional relationship. It might even cause the client to withhold
the very kind of full disclosure that purportedly justified strong
confidentiality in the first place. Of course, this itself is unverified
causal speculation, but it is not significantly less plausible than the
standard empirical arguments.
Of course, what really is at stake here cannot be cast in purely
consequentialist terms. Arguments based on trust in the professional
relationship and respect for the basic human dignity of lawyer and
client also have a distinctively moral quality. The issue is not merely
whether respect fosters professional effectiveness. The lawyer and
client relationship has moral value in its own right. The damage to
human respect is moral damage. Thus, consequentialist arguments
spill over into "deontological" terrain.
Typically, deontological arguments evaluate actions and judg-
ments according to their intrinsic morality, apart from their conse-
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quences. A deontologist could insist that the public defender simply
has a moral duty to stop this severe harm to another individual, no
matter how detrimental the exercise of this duty may be to confidenti-
ality, effectiveness, or the functioning of the legal system. Some
deontologists would cast this reasoning in the language of individual
rights, arguing that the rights of the wrongfully accused man have
moral priority over the institutional goods confidentiality promotes.
Already, this reasoning seems to provide a more straightforward path
to a decision against secrecy.
Could a deontologist possibly justify professional silence in any
circumstances where the result may be harm to another? If not, a
rights-based approach would seem to rule out much of what lawyers
do since the results of winning cases and planning business transac-
tions are often that someone suffers somewhere. Indeed, someone
might object, even a tax lawyer wreaks some harm to others by
helping a client to maneuver around loopholes in the law to minimize
taxes owed.
Some arguments favoring confidentiality are actually deonto-
logical. The intrinsic dignity of every human being means that even
a grievous criminal offender deserves adequate legal representation.
The trust in the lawyer and client relationship has moral value for its
own sake, which weighs against treachery or exploitation. Like the
consequentialist arguments, however, claims of intrinsic morality in
the professional relationship are not absolute. In fact, they yield more
quickly to considerations like preventing avoidable harm to innocent
individuals who also possess dignity and deserve respect.
Any inherent moral quality of the lawyer and client confedera-
tion can yield to subsequent developments. By confessing, the client
has enlisted the professional's involvement in his decisions. Once he
bestows nearly exclusive knowledge on his lawyer, he has thrust that
attorney into a morally-charged field. At that moment, the profes-
sional acquires some duties. She is no longer a bystander, but must
make moral decisions and act upon them. This is not a situation
where harms are past and the client's reparation to society is the only
concern. Passivity will just not do.
The first professional obligation is to investigate as far as
possible, within timing and other constraints, the reliability of the
information obtained. On these facts, further inquiries have con-
vinced the lawyer that the client is being truthful. Let us assume that
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questioning the client is enough to assuage doubts under the
circumstances. 7 The lawyer has another clear duty to compare the
morality of following any natural inclinations to disclose to the moral
implications of professional silence. A further moral demand is that
the professional confer with the client, encouraging him to take steps
to prevent the death. If feasible within the time remaining, it would
be desirable for the lawyer to consult with trusted colleagues, as this
dialogue might provide helpful insights.
Despite careful moral analysis, both the consequentialist and
deontologist miss the full wrongs contemplated here. The moral
character of both lawyer and client are squarely on the line. It is not
bare duty that should give the lawyer pause, thus inviting conflict
between the general moral duties of a human being and the special-
ized duties of a professional, or conflict between duties to the client
and innocent third parties. Nor is it enough to measure the terrible
consequences of inaction against the consequences to the criminal
justice system of professionals stepping out of role. Also at stake is
the moral personhood of both lawyer and client. The lawyer who
disregards the moral sirens blaring in this case is not moved by the
most basic of moral injunctions against knowingly contributing to
acute harm. This may show grave lack of moral integrity, if integrity
involves honoring fundamental moral principles in the face of
adversity.
Someone might respond that our public defender is doing just
that-she is standing by her professional oath of advocacy. Indeed,
adversity is nowhere more clear. This lawyer must sacrifice her own
moral comfort, and perhaps her public image, to serve her client and
her professional vows. The problem with this response is that pledges
of professional loyalty are not self-justifying. A license to practice
does not grant moral license. Each day professionals remake the
institutions that predated their entry into the profession. Both their
acts and inaction constitute part of those institutional frameworks.
Thus, professionals have the responsibility to evaluate each contribu-
tion they make. They must avoid directions that do not withstand
minimal moral scrutiny.
Could she appeal to the moral value of client autonomy to justify
secrecy to her own satisfaction? While autonomy is important to
7. If time and circumstances allow, a professional might have to do more than consult
with a client to corroborate information.
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human dignity, it is not valuable under all circumstances and implies
an evaluative dimension. Safeguarding the client's autonomy to do
manifest evil is hardly a good reason to justify professional silence.
Autonomy is also a relational idea since personal identity does not
develop in isolation. The client's autonomy cannot be judged apart
from its impacts on those he touches.
A legitimate objection to this rich notion of autonomy is that its
elasticity allows professionals to make dangerous personal judgments
about their clients that reflect prejudice and cultural biases. Profes-
sionals abuse their power when they regularly second guess their
clients by making paternalistic judgments about what the client
"really" wants or needs. The professional relationship is ripe for such
abuses because of inherent disparities between the professional and
client in relevant knowledge, experience, and emotional vulnerability.
Only the professional has command of the magic words that can
relieve the client's distress.
These background conditions of professional practice do present
moral risks, Professionals need to be vigilant about casual impositions
of expert authority. These cautions hardly justify complete deference
to a client's stated wants, however. Even assuming the public
defender confers further with her client and concludes that he prefers
inaction after all, she cannot permit this exercise of his autonomy
simply out of fear of imposing her will. She needs to explain to the
client that this is not a moral possibility open to her.8
Intermediate measures are available short of simply proclaiming
her moral rectitude and intention to turn the client in at once. The
client has invited a wonderful opportunity for moral conversation by
his confession and mention of moral and religious concerns. He has
portrayed himself as someone larger than a seeker of narrow legal
advice. Moreover, he already has yielded some autonomy by
involving another person in his moral decision. Now the lawyer's own
moral autonomy is at stake.
Although it is not my primary aim to explore practical options
exhaustively, the existence of alternatives is relevant to the lawyer's
moral obligations. She cannot ignore the client's interests even
8. The public defender should have explained that her duty of confidentiality has
narrow limits at the outset of the relationship. This is necessary to avoid deceiving the
client and tricking him into saying prejudicial things he might otherwise withhold. Even
if the result of her explanation is to inhibit the client somewhat from providing this kind
of guilty information, I believe that is a necessary cost of fairness and truthfulness.
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though she cannot comply if the client decides upon secrecy. One
possibility is that the client will agree to reveal his own deed in a
timely manner. It is not altogether foolish to explore this option with
the client since he has expressed some distress over the impending
death and has indicated some awareness that his moral integrity is on
the line. Realistically, the client will probably resist this bald option,
especially given his precarious "three strikes" status. In fact, the
client broached confession in the context of seeking a "deal."
Thus the lawyer should prepare to counsel the client on middle-
ground possibilities. She might consider pursuing immunity for this
client if he agrees to come forward with the information that would
exculpate the condemned man. She might try negotiating with the
prosecutor handling her client's current case. She might offer to
provide highly significant information only on condition of an advance
promise of full immunity for any criminal prosecutions related to that
information.9 Or, she might petition to present this information in
camera directly to an appropriate court, so that only the court would
have access to the information for purposes of deciding how to
proceed. She might avail herself of the state's executive pardon
process, offering the exculpating information in exchange for an
agreement that protects her client. Of course, any of these moves
carries practical risks, which she must reveal to her client when she
seeks his input. For example, the prosecution could refuse to
9. A famous legal ethics case, sometimes called ihe "Lake Pleasant" case after the
site of a murder, involved such an attempt at bargaining. The court appointed a Syracuse,
New York attorney, Frank Armani, to represent Robert Garrow, a man accused of
murdering a teenager in upstate New York. Armani engaged the assistance of attorney
Francis Beige, and the two men received a startling confession from Garrow. Their client
admitted to two other murders and informed the lawyers of the location of the bodies.
The lawyers went to the sites to corroborate the client's story and discovered the
decomposing bodies. For six months they told no one about their discovery, although they
anguished over this decision. Prior to trial they contacted the district attorney and
attempted to negotiate with him for the additional information in exchange for an
agreement to incarcerate Garrow in a mental health facility for the criminally insane.
Information about this case is available from a variety of sources but is collected in a book.
TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK H. ARMANI, PRIVILEGED INFORMATION (1984); see, e.g.,
Bryce Nelson, Ethical Dilemma: Should Lawyers Turn in Clients?, L.A. TIMES, July 2,
1974, at 1, reprinted in ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY 221-24 (3d ed. 1989); see also People v. Garrow, 379 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1976)
(holding that lawyer's disclosure of the whereabouts of defendant's murder victims did not
violate lawyer-client privilege after defendant's voluntary confession at trial); In re Armani,
359 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Onondaga County Ct. 1974) (granting motion to allow investigation of
lawyer who withheld evidence of murder obtained under lawyer-client privilege in order
to determine presence of wrongdoing).
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negotiate on such terms." If so, the public defender might have
endangered her client by arousing suspicions that further criminal
actions are possible against him.
Aside from the practical risks, however, the idea of bargaining
over the life of another intuitively seems reprehensible." In addition
to offering the state a Faustian choice, a successful bargain could
relieve the client of punishment for his crime. On the other hand, this
result will occur anyway if events proceed on schedule and the client
guards his secret. Although assisting the client in escaping a murder
charge would give him an unjust windfall, this strategy might be the
best way for the public defender to resolve a difficult moral dilemma.
She does owe a strong obligation of loyalty to her client even though
she does not owe him silence in the face of impending death. In her
efforts to save an innocent man, she is not entirely free of a duty to
avoid unnecessary prejudice to her client. Thus, she may be forced
to pursue a reluctant bargain toward ambivalent success. She may
regret this course of action, but she need not feel guilty if this is the
best she can do under the circumstances.
A more serious concern may complicate her approach, however.
This client might repeat his crime. Conceivably, the client would be
free eventually to perpetrate violence, and if a bargain works on the
killing issue and the client escapes the "three strikes" status, or
prevails in the underlying drug offense, his freedom will come
relatively soon. On the other hand, the probability of the client
committing another murder is far less clear than the near certainty of
the impending execution. If time permits, the public defender might
try to gauge the likelihood of a repeated violent crime by insisting
that the client submit himself to a private psychiatric examination
designed to evaluate his propensities for violence. Such predictions
are notoriously unreliable, however. Besides, then the lawyer would
have involved still another professional who has duties of her own.
The specter of future violence should at least drive the public
defender back to the moral drawing board before deciding to seek
complete immunity. If appropriate to the client's mental condition,
she might ask the client to agree to incarceration in a facility for the
criminally insane, and make this the condition of providing the state
10. This did happen in the Lake Pleasant case.
11. The public understandably was deeply offended by Armani's and Belge's attempts
to bargain for their client. See People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 801 (Onondaga County
Ct. 1975).
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with information. 12 She would need to explain to the client, howev-
er, that such institutions are sometimes more dreadful than prisons,
and that his chances for eventual release would be more open-ended.
He may well refuse this alternative, or something close to it.
If the public defender explores each reasonable option and the
client rejects each, she is not off the hook. She is right to explore
ways to mitigate harm to the client within the constraints of feasibility
and time. In the end, however, she may have no choice but to violate
the client's preferences. She needs to make it starkly clear to the
client that she will work on his behalf, but that she has an indepen-
dent moral duty to forestall the execution.
This may be a time when she is simply unable to do anything else
because of the kind of person she is. She is not being self-indulgent
to rely on her core sense of self. Moral integrity is not a luxury or its
loss a price of becoming a professional. Even assessed consequential-
ly, such a cost would not be wise. Those who lack integrity do not
strive to become better. They lose or never acquire the motivation
to care about the kind of person they are or will become. Profession-
als need integrity to serve their clients and professions well. Without
a moral center a person cannot develop an abiding self-respect that,
in turn, feeds the capacity to respect others. Professions cannot
survive on sanctions and rules. They require ideals and professional
commitment to those ideals. Such allegiance springs from personal
integrity.
Those who formalize the rules and ideals of a profession need to
leave room for integrity to thrive. This means that no rule should
thwart the most basic moral judgments of those bound by the rules.
The legal profession has known for years about the wrenching facts
posed in this Symposium. 3 Yet the lawyers who shape regulatory
policy have repeatedly ducked opportunities to address this type of
situation. This omission leads most lawyers to the conclusion that the
12. This was the strategy selected by Armani and Belge. According to Armani, they
never sought complete liberty for their client. See id.
13. I have in mind the real case of Leo Frank. In 1915 Frank was convicted for the
murder of a young girl. He received a death sentence. Before Frank was executed
another man revealed to his lawyer that he had committed the murder. Then the governor
of Georgia commuted Frank's sentence to life imprisonment. Because death was no
longer at stake, the attorney who had received the confession decided to remain silent.
An angry mob then lynched Leo Frank. See KAUFMAN, supra note 9, at 215-16
(describing the case facts), Arthur G. Powell, Privilege of Counsel and Confidential
Communications, 6 GA. B.J. 333 (1944) (providing an analysis of the case by the lawyer
who had received the murderer's confession).
WHEN SILENCE SCREAMS
existing rules mandate silence in this situation. This is because so-
called "past crimes" are candidates for the strongest confidentiality
protection. Without this priority, criminals who confessed to their
lawyers could not receive an adequate defense.
The profession could create an exception to confidentiality for
past crimes in situations where subsequent harm to another is
imminent and grave. In fact, lawyers' ethical codes already contain
such exceptions for future acts. 4 The reason for treating past and
future crimes differently is that the lawyer has the ability to prevent
future harm, whereas the injuries from past acts have already
unfolded. Yet this is not the case here. Grave harm from this past
act is still imminent and preventable.
One might hesitate about a specific exception that would require
revelation of a past act to prevent serious harm. Such an exception
might be inflexible. Lawyers might feel compelled to reveal confi-
dences about past acts even when they have serious doubts about the
accuracy of a client's confessions, for example. Yet language in the
existing codes already might address this concern fairly well. One
rule employs the words "reasonably believes" to give the lawyer
discretion to reveal a client's future intentions, for example. A
discretionary rule might function quite well in this context because a
lawyer could evaluate the unique circumstances in deciding whether
to violate a confidence. Without some latitude, many lawyers might
even risk "ethical disobedience" by violating the code to save a life.
If so, this plight could hardly inspire their respect for the codes that
govern them. On the other hand, some lawyers might rush to
judgment to obtain emotional relief Discretionary language such as
"reasonably believes" may be overly broad for lawyers seeking a
quick resolution to an agonizing problem.
Another concern is with allowing discretion at all. Perhaps the
revelation should be mandatory in a case like this one, where the
lawyer has little doubt about the truthfulness of the client's confes-
sion, and the severest of harms is virtually certain to occur without
timely intervention. A rule could mandate disclosure, using stronger
language like "reasonably certain" or "certain beyond a reasonable
doubt" that the revelation is "necessary to prevent imminent death."
Such tighter language would pare the cases requiring inflexible
14. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 4-101(C)(3); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule
1.6(b)(1).
15. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
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disclosure to few. At the same time this mandate may discourage
lawyers from grappling with this problem in a way that reveals its
complexities. A ready remedy lets lawyers off the hook too easily to
allow them to grow from the situation. It also discourages them from
thinking of creative solutions that might best serve their remaining
loyalties to the client and the particularities of the case at hand.
Some imprecision would inevitably result from applying even the
clearest words to messy cases, but this kind of haziness is eminently
familiar to lawyers. The profession has not hesitated to regulate with
copious imperfection in other areas of ethics, so it is difficult to see
insurmountable obstacles here. Interpretive and personal develop-
ment problems are inevitable any time a profession attempts to
translate complex moral judgments into rules. No code should spare
a professional the moral anguish that permeates this situation. A
code that promises this result through false specificity, on the one
hand, or conscious evasion, on the other, does not serve those it
governs very well.
A criminal defense lawyer, psychiatrist, or member of the clergy
who has chosen the right vocation could not fail to experience pangs
of conscience in considering how to proceed in this case. That is as
it should be. Professionals need to struggle with painful and complex
matters to develop as morally wise. Moral wisdom is a professional
ideal that fosters respectful relationships, thoughtful execution of
institutional duties, legal reform, and appreciation of the role of
lawyers in serving the community. The moral wisdom that produces
the finest professionals is not imposed from without. It cannot come
entirely from sizing up either consequences or duties. Neither can it
come from glibly following an ethical code. Moral wisdom germi-
nates, instead, in the inward motivation to'become a better person.
This has been a long, perhaps convoluted, but I hope not tortured
trail to what most people might conclude in a snap. Is it worthwhile
to follow the rougher path? I think so. Consensus on moral matters
is useful, to be sure. Teachers of ethics who spend much of their time
discussing ambiguous cases know how unsettling it can be for students
to leave every discussion with more uncertainty than before.
Sometimes a fairly stark case can produce the kind of strong
consensus that relieves people of debilitating moral skepticism. Yet
even a fairly clear case has more complexities than a hasty glance
reveals. Furthermore, that something seems morally clear certainly
does not mean that it is easy. Lonely or not, it is the lot of every
professional to wrestle with these realities.
